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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOE TOTORICA, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RAY E. THOMAS, et al, 
REUIANCE NATI'ON.A:L 
LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BR'IEF 
NATU;RE OF ·THE CASE 
Case No. 
10,1'52 
For convenience Plaintiff...1Respondent will here-
inafter in this brief be referred to simply as plain-
tiff, and Defendant-Appellant will be referred to 
as defendant. 
This is a contest for priority between a lien-
claimant (plaintiff) and a mortgagee (defendant) 
wherein the majority of the construction of the 
building in quesftnn was completed before the re-
cording of defendant's mortgage and defendant 
claims that plaintiff's lien was not filed or sued 
upon in time. From judgment for plaintiff, defen-
dant appeals. 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWE'R COURT 
Mter hearing evidence of both parties the Dis-
trict Court determined that plaintiff's lien was 
properly and timely filed; that its suit to foreclose 
was begun in ti'me ; and that its lien was superior 
to that of defendant whose mor.tgage was recorded 
near the comple'tion of the work done by plaintiff. 
RELIEF S'OU·GH'T ON APPE~L 
Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the 
District Court affirmed, and for its costs and at-
torneys' fees incurred in bringing this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACT'S. 
Plaintfff, a duly licensed genera'! contractor, 
contracted with Ray E. Thomas to construct a resi-
dence at 1916 'South 16th East for the sum of 
$12,000.00 contract price; on1y the sum of $9,000.00 
was paid. Plaintiff recorded a notice of lien on 
April 10, 1'96'2, and filed an action to foreclose said 
lien on M~arch '2'8, 196'3. Defendan1t made a loan on 
the property in question on ·March 15, 19'6'2, and 
received ;a note and mortgage which were recorded 
on March 2'3, t9'612. A.t the time of making said loan 
the construction of .. the premises by plaintiff was 
mostly complete. 
Although ~the premises were not completed 'they 
were occupied by Daniel G. Thomas, the brother of 
the Ray Thomas, with whom plaintiff contracted 
in Septe·mber, 19'61. ·After occupancy by 'Thomas, 
plaintiff continued to complete the construc1tion of 
2 
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the premises on a fairly regular basis, (R-7'5 Hne 
1-l and following). Plaintiff testified to specific 
items of work done on the premises in every month 
from September, 1961, through April, 19:62, except 
the month of December, 19·61. 
After January 22, 19612, a period eighty (80) 
days prior to the filing of plaintiff's lien, plaintiff; 
(a) Installed rain guttering. Although i't was 
not specifically provided for in the contract, plain-
tiff provided the guttering at his own expense be-
cause he felt that it was a part of the contract. (R-
7 4 'line 23 and fo'Uowing.) 
('b) Plaintiff installed an aluminum mullion 
in the corner of a corner window which was neces-
sary to prevent wind from blowing through an open-
ing otherwise left in said corner. 
(c) Plaintiff plastered the foundation which 
could not have been plastered during the winter 
months because of a requirement thrut it be done in 
n1ild weather. (R-66 line 10 and the following and 
R-87 line 17 .and following.) 
(d) Plaintiff painted the carport. The paint-
ing had not been completed earlier because the own-
er wanted to have that work done by another con-
tractor and failed because of a misunderstanding 
between the owner and the other contractor. 
3 
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ARGUMENT 
POIN'T I 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTI1CE OF LIEN W A!S FILED 
WITHI1N THE TIME .AND IN THE MANNER RE-
QUIRED BY LAW. 
Whether plainti'ff's Jiien was timely recorded 
was the matter about which the trial of this case 
revdlved. Defendant had opportunity ~and did meet 
this issue fully at trial. The 'Trial court having the 
benefit of all the argument now offered to this 
Court, 'together with the evidence in "live" forn1 
decided that question against it. This Court should 
not now substitute i'ts judgment for that of the trial 
court on what is essentially a question of .£act, i.e., 
whether 'the contract was completed prior to J anu-
ary 22, 196'2, or 80 days prior to the date the lien 
was recorded. 
In support of its arguments, Reliance has cited 
Wilcox vs. Clow~ard, 5'6 Pacific 2nd 1, 88 Utah 503, 
saying at page 11 of its brief, 
"Under the rule of Wilcox v. Cloward, . . . 
trivial or minor adjustments done after the 
main work may not be used by contractor to 
· extend his lien rights." 
It may be that we can reduce the dispute here to 
~'whi'ch party· correctly interprets the Wilcox case?" 
Plaintiff, too, believes it to be controlling. Tt is on 
i!ts facts and a number~ of its legal points strikingly 
s'im:i1ar to the case at bar. Let's examine it. 
To the extent applicable here it involves claims 
4 
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of two different contractors, Wilcox and Ferguson, 
competing for priority with the mortgagee who con-
tend, as here, that the contractors were late in fil-
ing their liens and bringing thei'r action. The con-
tractors in turn re1ied upon certain small last jobs 
done by them in the completion of their contract 
after occupancy of the premises by the owners. The 
specific facts and the Court's analysis and rulings 
can be found at pages 6, 7 and 8 of the 5'2 Pacific 
2d Reporter and pages 513 and following of 'tlie 
88 Utah Reporter. Because of the length of what 
we consider to be the pertinent parts thereof we 
do not quote those pages here but in the alternative 
set forth a summary of the points made by the court 
in that case. At the same time we strongly urge 
upon the Court the relevance of the discussion on 
those pages to the problems in the instant case. 
1. In the case of both contractors 'the court 
in the Wilcox case found the lien rights were valid 
and had priority. 
2. 'The items of last work are factually com-
parable to the case :at bar. ·The case at bar being, 
if anything, stronger. 
3. The court repeatedly deferred to :the judg-
ment of the lower court because of its advantageous 
dbservation of the evidence. 
4. The importance of a continuous pattern 
of work before and after the cruci,a[ date was db-
served. In the instant case work was done in Sep-
5 
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temher, October, November, January, February, 
March and April of the years 1961 and 196'2 re-
spectively. In addition, plaintiiff testified, 
(!'Well, I can't remember the exact dates, but 
I know we worked -all along the line doing 
something in there. We always done some-
thing there." ('R-7'5, Iine 18.) 
5. 'The effect of whether the items of last 
work were done in good faith as part of the con-
tra'ct or were done for the purpose of extending 
the lien period was observed. In this case the work 
done was done at the request of 1the owner, and w·as 
necessary to complete the con tract. 
6. A distinction was made between trivial or 
minor adjustments made casually and long after the 
main work :and small comparatively minor jobs made 
to complete the contract. A further distinction is 
made between work remedial in na:ture and work 
done to finish or complete the job. In this case the 
foundation plastering, carport painting, rain gutter-
ing, and window mullion were obviously installed 
to complete the jdb. 
7. The court reviewed a number of cases and 
the last work sufficient to extend the lien period 
in each included, 
('a) Cleaning up debris. 
(b) Installing heavier wires. 
· (c) A '~light of marble stairs. 
(d) A seco11d coat of paint. 
(e) A grate, man tie and tiling. 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8. The court observed the frequently control-
ling significance of whether the work in question 
was done at the instance of the owner. It noted that 
at times this was decided on an estoppel basis. De-
fendant observes at page '5 of his brief that the 
rain guttering and other items were done at the 
insistance and request of Daniel G. Thom1as, the 
brother of Ray Thomas and the person defendant 
now claims is the owner of the premises. 
9. The court observed with approval and cited 
cases holding that, 
"Where there is a conflict in the evidence, not 
only the finding of 1the court as to what work 
and when it was done will be accepted by the 
review court, but, further, the lower court's 
finding the ultim~ate fact that the work was 
bona fide in a continuaJtion of or by way of 
completion of the contract which the plaintiff 
was bound to perform will :also be a~cepted 
by the review court; see Foster v. Brickbank, 
Supra: 'whether the items of work done after 
the date on which the appeUant claimed the 
building was completed were "trivial imper--
fections" was a ma~ter of fact to be deter-
minea by t'he court'. Willamette Steam Mills 
Company v. Kremer, 9'4 Cal. 205, 29 Pacific 
633; Stigger v. McPhee, Supra. These cases 
held that the court's deduction that the work 
was done in good faith and that i:t was not a 
minor or trivial repair and that it was some-
thing still necessary in the completion of the 
contract, must stand unless ·clearly erron-
eous." 
The court in the Wilcox case relied largely on an an-
7 
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nota'tion at 54 ALR 984 entitled "Substitution or 
Replacement of Material .as Affecting 'Time for 
Filing Mechanics Lien.'' 
The Wilcox case also contradicts Reliance's 
assertion ~that because a lien foreclosure is an equity 
case '''this court may fully review the facts as well 
as the condlusions before the trial court". The court 
in Wilcox said as page 4 of the 5'6 Pacific 2d Re-
porter and at page 510 of the 88 Utah Reporter, 
''In an equity case i·t has been the rule of this 
court not to disturb a finding of the lower 
court on contested or conflicting evidence un-
less the evidence clear'ly preponderates the 
conclusion or finding." (Emphasis added) 
The bald assertion made without .argument or auth-
ority that the burden is on plaintiff asserting what 
is incorrectly characterized as a delayed mechanics' 
lien to estahHsh strict compliance with statutory 
requirements is likewise Wi'thout merit. UCA 68-'3-2 
provides: 
"The rule of the ·common law that statutes 
in derogation thereof are to be strictly con-
strued has no application to 'the statutes of 
this state. The statutes establish the laws of 
this state respecting the sub'jects to which they 
rela'te, and· their provisions· and all proce~d­
ings under them are to be liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the sta-
tutes and to promote justice. Whenever there 
is .any variance between the rules of equity 
and the rules of common law in reference to 
the sa,me matter the rules of equity shall pre.. 
vail." 
8 
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This court applied that rule to lien foreclosure situ-
ations in the case of Elwell v. Morrow, 78 Pacific 
605-Utah-, by the following language : 
"The weight of authority is to the effect that 
the well e·stablished rule that remedial pro-
visions of sta.tutes are ~to be liberally constru-
ed applies to, and should be followed in, pro-
ceedings to foreclose 'mechanics liens." 
POINT II 
DEFENT''S ARGUMENT THAT PLAIN'TIFF'S. AC-
TION TO FORECLOSE THE LIEN WAS NOT F'llJED 
\VITHIN 'THE TIME A1LLOWED B Y LAW, IS 
SPECIOUS. 
Defendant in its brief has done some mental 
gymnastics with the provisions of 'UCA 3'8-1-11, to 
impose upon plaintiff in this Court a comp[etely 
distorted but never intended interpretation of that 
statute. 'The first sentence of that statute is :a,s fol-
lows: 
"Actions to enforce the liens herein provided 
for must be begun within twelve monrths after 
the completion df the original contract, or 
the suspension of work thereunder for a 
period of thirty days." 
Defendant begins 'its distortion by telling us that 
the twelve-month period '·'starts" (appellant's 'brief 
page 16.) The thought conveyed is that once it starts 
it can't be turned off. He then subtly inserts an 
"either" 'before the completion or suspension alter~ 
natiYes which the framers of the statute apparently 
didn~t feel was required. (Appellant's brief page 
16, 4th line from the bottom.) He then completes 
9 
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his work by returning to the starting date concept 
which he tells us can be initiated in either of the 
two alternate ways. (Appellant's brief, page 17, 
second paragraph.) 
This distortion is difficult to e~pose because of 
its novelty. As far as this writer can determine no 
one has had the temerity to impose such an argu-
ment on this or any other appellant court before. It 
is s'ignificant tha1t no case was cited by defendant 
in support of it. 
Perhaps the best answer is to just invite plain 
reading of the first sentence of the statute, 
''Actions to enforce ~the liens herein provided 
for musit be begun wi·thin twelve months after 
the comple~ion of the original contract, or 
the suspension of work thereunder for a 
period of thirty days." 
If we put a period after contract we have no prob-
lem, the sentence then reads ''Actions must be begun 
within twelve months of completion of the original 
contra'Ct." By adding ''or" as an alternative the 
problem should not be increased. The "or" does not 
impose anything additional, only an alternative. 
To find the intention of the legislature let's put 
ourselves in the shoes of the drafter of this provi· 
sion. Obviously he couldn't just conclude with a 
period after "completion of the contract" because 
he wouldn't then pr'ovide liens in cases where the 
contract was not complleted. So he added the arter-
10 
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native not as an additional limitation but to pro-
vide for not completed contracts. 
This becomes clearer upon an examination of 
the absurd results that would 'follow the interpre-
tation urged by defendant. First it would render 
the provision in'Consistent with the time for filing 
notice of lien provisions. 'That is, in a case where 
work was interrupted for an excess of thirty days 
near the beginning or in the middle of a particular 
job by say a strike or material shortage and then 
resumed for more than 'a year, according to de-
fen1dant's interpretation the contractor could file 
hrs lien in plenty of time but could never sue on it. 
Second, and perhaps most importantly, it wouid 
impose upon mechanics and material men an obliga-
tion to wafuh jobs to which they furnished material 
or services not only to see if they were completed 
but also to observe 'if 'any work stoppages exceeded 
thirty days. This would include, as here, even mech-
anics and material men who knew that they them-
selves would later 1add a;ddi tiona! work or rna terial 
to the project. As above pointed ·out the lien statutes 
being remedial in nature should be libera~1y con-
strued to give their intended remedy to mechanics 
and materials men. Mo'reover, neither material men, 
mortgagees n'or the courts should be saddled by the 
uncertainty inherent in the rule proposed by de-
fendant. Imagine, if you will, the invitation to law·· 
suits over whether work stoppages were for more 
or less than the thirty-day period. 'Consider also 
11 
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the opportunity given to conniving property owners 
on prolonged projects to avoid the effect of the llen 
laws. 
POIN'T III 
THE EQUI'TTES DO NOT FAVOR DE'FENDANT 
AS ASSERTED IN ITS BRIEF. 
Defendant, money changer, piously protests it 
is more inn:ocent than plaintiff, carpenter, from 
whom it now prays prntection. But let's exam'ine the 
matter. This is not a situation where a mortgagee 
makes construction possible with 'its money only 
to find that all of the laborers and material men 
have a prior claim because a relatively insignifi-
cant item of work that eS'caped its notice was done 
prior to construction. If it were, defendant's cries of 
ex post facto and statutory amnesty, etc., while an 
affront to a long-established rule of 1aw, would at 
least be understandable. In this case plaintiff had 
advanced most of the money and bui1t the ma'jor 
part of the buflding prior to defendant's lo'an which 
'looked to that self-same building for its 1Security. 
Defendant compl'ains, without any proof or evidence 
in the record, that it did not know of plaintiff's 
clai'm and that because of its lack of knowledge, 
which it calls innocence, it should be preferred. What 
it asks thereby is that after plaintiff had inve'sted 
his money and labors in the building that the cir-
cumstances of defendants then loaning money with-
out know ledge or control on the part of p1ainiliff 
should deprive plaintiff of his security. 
12 
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Let us turn now to whether defendants claimed 
'lack of knowledge was, as it says, "innocence", or 
whether it is more aptly described as negligence. 
We assume for sake of argument and l'ack of evi-
dence that said failure of knowledge is real. Mort-
gagee's customarNy inspect property upon which 
they loan money. An inspection of this property 
would have revealed very new construction - it 
woul'd be impossi1Jle to teTI exactly how new- but 
the apparent newness should have placed on the 
proposed mortgagee a duty of inquiry. Any kind of 
closer exam ina uion at all would have reve'aled the 
fact that the home was not yet finished, that the 
painting was not complete and that the foundation 
was unplastered. Inquiry of the mortgagor by some-
thing more than a dry routine form would have re-
vealed the 'Situation. (We are reminded by defen-
dant's brief that the comp1etion was at their in-
sistence. Appellant's brief, page 5.) Of course, if 
we assume that upon inquiry _they 'did or would 
have misrepresented the fact of completion, defen-
dant not p'laintiff shou'ld suffer the consequences 
for having deaJlt with a tHief. Plraintiff, on the other 
hand, could not protect hims~f from !defendant's 
coming in and loaning the Thomases money at a 
time when the majori'ty of his money was alrerady 
advanced. His only protection lies in the enforce-
ment of the laws he now ·asks this Court to uphold 
and which the trial Court has already upheld -
la,vs the operation of which were at all times fully 
known by defendant. 
1'3 
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There is one other matter. Defendant grandly 
gestures that plaintiff can look to the person with 
whom he contracted for his money. This is of course 
a1lso true of defendant except that defendant has 
an addi tiona;l'ad¥an tage, that being a written prom-
issory note providing for interest and attorney's 
fees which p~aintiff does not have. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S LiiEN ON LOTS 29 AND 30, BLOCK 
2, EAST WE'S'TMINSTEH ADDITION, IS iS'UPERIOR 
TO 'THA'T OF D'EIFEN'DAN'T. 
Defendant has at pages 14 and 15 of its brief, 
without m'aking any specific point, cri ticize1d the 
dismissal of Daniel Thom·a;s's who he now claims 
are the record owners of the property in question. 
Defendant's attorney, filing .an answer for it and 
both the Ray and Daniel Thom'ases, alleged in said 
answer that Daniel 'Thomases were tenants of R;ay 
Thomas's, (R-14). So that this Court will not be 
confused, plainti!f now draws atten~ion to a stipula-
tion (R-44) whereby defendants Daniel Thomases 
stipu~ate to judgment of foreclo'sure. For purpose of 
this proceeding plain tiff asks only that this Court 
affirm that as to Lnts 29 and 30, B•lock 2 of E·ast 
Westminster Subdivision, Satt Lake County, Utah, 
plaintiff's lien is superior to that of defendant. 
POINT V 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED 'TO ATTORNEY~S FEE 
ON ~PPEAL. 
UC'A 38-1-18, as amended, provides: 
"In any action brought to enforce any lien 
14 
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under this chapter the successful party shall 
be en ti tied to recover a reasonable attorney's 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxes as cost of this action." 
Plaintiff received judgment in the lower court 
for attorneys' fees in the sum of $568.33. This fee 
was obviously only intended to cover attorneys' fees 
incurred to judgment. As this Court wen knows, a 
great dea'l of preparation and expense are required 
to bring a case before it, for whi~ch plaintiff is en-
ti ~led to recover. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the District Court that p'l'ain-
tiff's 11en and suit were filed in time is entitled to 
a presumption of correctness 'by this Court that has 
not been rebutte1d. More than that, it is both correct 
and fair. Plaintiff respectfully urges that it should 
be affirmed, and th'at plaintiff should be awarded 
its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing 
this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS M. HAYNIE 
MAS YANO 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff -Respondent 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
15 
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